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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

2 December 1959

### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK

USSR: In his speech to the Hungarian party congress on 1 December, Khrushchev maintained the moderate and flexible line which has characterized his foreign policy pronouncements since his visit to the US. He denied "fabrications" in the Western press that the USSR no longer desires an early summit meeting. He repeated the warning contained in the TASS statement of 18 November that Moscow will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the West refuses to conclude a treaty with both German states, but avoided any suggestion that such unilateral action is imminent. This speech, like his last two foreign policy speeches, contained evidence that Khrushchev is concerned over Peiping's challenge to Moscow's ideological primacy and hegemony in the Communist world and the Chinese Communists' apparent misgivings regarding his peaceful coexistence line.

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
OK

Communist China: The absence from Peiping of several key officials suggests that a meeting of top party leaders is in progress or may be imminent. Mao Tse-tung and his first deputy, Liu Shao-chi, have been away from the capital since late October and may have been joined in November by Premier Chou En-lai and other politburo members. The US Consulate General in Hong Kong believes that plans for a new "leap forward" in 1960 and the disposition of "rightist" critics of the regime would be likely topics for discussion.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA



Pakistan-CENTO: Pakistani President Ayub apparently intends to broaden the range of relationships between the regional members of CENTO. According to a Pakistani official, Ayub, as a result of his talks with the Shah and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes in mid-November, wants a meeting of Moslem CENTO members every three months, thus excluding Britain and US observers. The next meeting is scheduled for February, in Pakistan, with the Shah and Turkish President Bayar visiting Ayub.]

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### III. THE WEST

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Cyprus: London's decision to lift within the week the ban against AKEL, the Communist-front party on Cyprus, enhances the prospect of a strong Communist bid for increased power)

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DAILY BRIEF

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[redacted] and influence. Archbishop Makarios has endorsed the removal of the ban, and the Turks offered no objection. AKEL, apparently unsuccessful in gaining its demands from Makarios, including a commitment for nearly half of the Greek Cypriot seats in the new Parliament, has swung its support to opposition candidate Clerides. [redacted]

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[redacted] (Page 6)

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Khrushchev's Speech in Budapest

In his speech at the Hungarian party congress on 1 December, Khrushchev reaffirmed the moderate and flexible line on negotiations and coexistence which has characterized his pronouncements on foreign policy since his visit to the United States. He denied "fabrications" in the Western press that the USSR no longer desires an early summit meeting and said the Soviet Government is ready to attend such a meeting "at a time and place that would be acceptable to all the participants."

Although Khrushchev contended there is no reason why a summit conference could not be held prior to his visit to France beginning on 15 March, he said President de Gaulle's desire to have an exchange of views with him prior to a conference is "not unreasonable." The Soviet premier's caution in avoiding criticism of De Gaulle's position on the timing of a summit meeting, coupled with other recent efforts to appear responsive to French views, reflects Moscow's hope that De Gaulle's bid to enhance France's international prestige can be exploited to divide the Western allies and weaken their position at a summit meeting.

In contrast to this generous treatment of De Gaulle, Khrushchev directed a harsh attack against Chancellor Adenauer as the "most active" opponent of an improvement in East-West relations. He repeated the warning contained in the TASS statement of 18 November that Moscow will conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the West refuses to sign a treaty with both German states. However, he avoided any suggestion that such unilateral Soviet action is imminent or linked to the outcome of a summit meeting.

Khrushchev's speech, like his last two foreign policy statements on 31 October and 14 November, contained evidence

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that he is concerned over Peiping's challenge to Moscow's ideological primacy and hegemony in the Communist world and the Chinese Communists' apparent misgivings regarding his peaceful coexistence strategy. In an effort to restore bloc discipline and unity behind Moscow's lead, Khrushchev invoked the "immutable principles of proletarian internationalism" as the "irrevocable law of the international Communist movement."

He charged that the "enemy" is seeking to provoke quarrels among the socialist countries and warned that if the leaders of any bloc country become "conceited," this "can only play into the hands of the enemy." In a further typically oblique criticism of Peiping's policies, Khrushchev said, "We must not fall behind or go too far ahead; we must, figuratively speaking, synchronize our watches"--a reminder of his dictum at the Soviet 21st party congress that all socialist countries will "more or less simultaneously reach the highest phase of Communist society."

Khrushchev avoided any reference to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, but Hungarian party chief Kadar in his speech on 30 November echoed the standard Soviet position that Soviet troops would be removed only in connection with an East-West agreement on a "mutual withdrawal of forces stationed in foreign countries." [Redacted]

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### Chinese Leaders May Be Meeting in Secret Session

The absence from Peiping of many of Communist China's top leaders suggests that a high-level party meeting is in progress or will soon be held. Mao Tse-tung and his first deputy, Liu Shao-chi, have been away from the capital since last October, and Premier Chou En-lai and other politburo members are thought to have left Peiping in November. Mao's tours in the past often foreshadowed conclaves of regional and national leaders.

A high-level party meeting at this time would probably be concerned with an evaluation of developments following Peiping's admission of serious economic shortcomings last summer. Plans for a new "leap forward" in 1960 and the disposition of "right opportunist" critics of the regime are likely agenda topics. The absence of the foreign minister from Peiping suggests that foreign policy may also come up for consideration, e. g., Peiping's deteriorating relations with India and Indonesia, Sino-Soviet relations, and the Taiwan and Lao-tian situations.

The pattern of Chinese Communist conferences in recent years suggests that a national party conclave can be expected before the end of the year. The meeting may take the form of a central committee plenum, although a session of the party congress--which last met in May 1958 and is supposed to hold annual sessions--is also a possibility.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Pakistani President Trying to Strengthen CENTO

[redacted]

[redacted] Pakistani President Ayub, who is taking an increasingly active part in foreign affairs, is moving to strengthen the alliance between the regional members of CENTO--Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. Furthermore, since his talk with Nehru in September, some progress has been made in settling border and financial disputes with India. Ayub is apparently motivated in part by a desire to strengthen his personal prestige and popularity.

As a result of talks with the Shah and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes in Tehran in mid-November, Ayub believes that there should be frequent high-level meetings of the regional members of CENTO, excluding Britain and US observers, according to a Pakistani Embassy official in Tehran. The next meeting is to be in February, in Pakistan.

According to the same Pakistani official, it was agreed during Ayub's visit to Tehran that Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey must continually seek to reassure Afghanistan of their friendship and their sincere desire for better relations, and that Qasim offered the only prospect for a properly oriented government in Iraq. He also said all three countries agreed that no new proposals for US aid should be broached during President Eisenhower's trip, but regional planning and a supreme command for CENTO should be brought up.] [redacted]

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### III. THE WEST

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#### Proscription of Communist-front Party on Cyprus to End

[London's decision to end the state of emergency on Cyprus soon, thus removing the four-year ban on the Communist-front party AKEL, enhances the prospect of a strong bid by the party for increased power and influence. Archbishop Makarios, despite the prospect of AKEL opposition to his candidacy for the presidency in the 13 December election, has endorsed London's plan. AKEL claims 7,000 members and has many times that number under its general influence. After it failed to get a firm commitment from Makarios for seven of the 35 Greek Cypriot seats in the new Cypriot House of Representatives, it swung its support to the dissident nationalist candidate John Clerides.

Makarios has tried to promote a working relationship with AKEL in order to maintain at least the facade of Greek Cypriot unity. Formation of the basically rightist opposition party, the Democratic Union, has shattered that illusion. The opposition opened its campaign by viciously attacking the London-Zurich agreements which form the basis for the Cyprus settlement as a "victory for the Turks" and the authorization for "three armies to act as our prison wardens." Makarios, who remains confident of political victory, has the support of all influential newspapers on Cyprus except the Communist mouth-piece.

AKEL probably views the current campaign and approaching election as a prime opportunity to encourage the split in the Greek Cypriot community. The greatest threat from AKEL may not emerge until the second election, to be held within five years. By that time, as a result of Greek factionalism, AKEL may have become the strongest political force on the island.]

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